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We propose a theory of equilibrium antitrust oversight in which: (i) regulators
launch investigations on the basis of suspicious bidding patters; (ii) cartels can adapt
to the statistical screens used by regulators, and may in fact use them to enforce car-
tel compliance. We emphasize the use of safe tests, i.e. tests that can be passed by
competitive players under a broad class of environments. Such tests do not hurt com-
petitive industries and do not help cartels support new collusive equilibria. We show
that optimal collusive schemes in plausible environments fail natural safe tests, and
that cartel responses to such tests explain unusual patterns in bidding data from pro-
curement auctions held in Japan. This provides evidence that adaptive responses from
cartels is a real concern that data-driven antitrust frameworks should take into account.
Keywords: collusion, auctions, procurement, antitrust.




Competition authorities commonly rely on statistical screens to detect and investigate collu-
sion between firms.1 Even if formal prosecution cannot rely on data-driven evidence alone,
detection tools can greatly facilitate the work of competition authorities. Such evidence can
be used in court to obtain warrants or authorization for a more intrusive investigation, ulti-
mately leading to actionable evidence and convictions (see Imhof et al., 2018, for a concrete
example).2 Furthermore, statistical evidence may be helpful in convincing cartel members
to apply to leniency programs.3 However, this growth in the use of statistical screens raises
numerous questions: Do firms adapt to the statistical tests implemented by competition
authorities? If they do, what is the impact of such screens in equilibrium? Can the tests
backfire and either strengthen cartels, or hurt competitive firms? Can we find tests that can-
not cause harm, and yet strictly reduce the incentives to form cartels? We provide theory
and evidence addressing these questions.
We model collusion in the shadow of antitrust authorities using a two-stage game. In
the first stage a group of firms repeatedly participates in a first-price procurement auction.
We allow firms to observe arbitrary signals about one another, and allow bidders’ costs and
types to be arbitrarily correlated within and across periods. In the second stage, an antitrust
authority observes the entire history of firms’ bidding behavior, and performs a screening
test to determine whether or not they acted competitively. Firms that don’t pass the test
1Competition authorities that use statistical analysis or algorithms to screen for collusion include those
in Brazil, South Korea, Switzerland and United Kingdom. A report by the OECD (2018) gives a brief
description of the screening programs used in Brazil, Switzerland and the U.K. A document titled “Cartel
Enforcement Regime of Korea and Its Recent Development” maintained by the Fair Trade Commission of
Korea describes South Korea’s bid screening program.
2Baker and Rubinfeld (1999) give an overview on the use of statistical evidence in court for antitrust
litigation. In some jurisdictions, statistical evidence from screens have been used successfully to build a
collusion case in court. See Mena-Labarthe (2015) for a case-study from Mexico.
3Screening of cartels can also be useful to those outside of antitrust authorities. For example, screening
can help procurement offices counter suspected bidding rings by more aggressively soliciting new bidders
or adopting auction mechanisms that are less susceptible to collusion. Screening may also be helpful for
internal auditors and compliance officers of complicit firms to identify collusion and help contain potential
legal risks arising from compliance failures.
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are further investigated, and may incur penalties if found guilty of bid-rigging. Investigation
may also be costly to non-cartel members. We say that the test used by the antitrust
authority is a safe test if and only if it is passed with probability one by competitive bidders
under arbitrary information environments. Our companion paper, Chassang et al. (2019),
develops a near exhaustive class of safe tests and illustrates their relevance by applying them
to Japanese procurement data.
Our main set of results suggest that antitrust oversight based on safe tests is a robust
improvement over laissez-faire. First, we show that regulation based on firm-level safe tests
does not expand the set of enforceable collusive schemes available to cartels. A similar
result holds when testing is done at the industry level, provided penalties against colluding
firms are large enough and we restrict attention to equilibria that are weakly renegotiation
proof (Bernheim and Ray, 1989, Farrell and Maskin, 1989). This contrasts with work by
Cyrenne (1999) and Harrington (2004) illustrating that arbitrary screens against collusion
may backfire and enhance the cartel’s ability to collude.
Second, we show that optimal collusive schemes in plausible environments fail natural safe
tests. Specifically, we show that in the maximally collusive scheme of a complete information
collusion game, bidders either bid at the reserve price, or submit nearly tied bids. These
configurations happen with zero-probability under competition, and naturally arise suspicion
from regulators. It is plausible that cartels would adapt to the presence of such tests: in the
face of a potential investigation a well working cartel would ensure that its members do not
submit excessively close bids, and do not bid too close to the reserve price.
In theory, this adaptive response by a cartel should lead to noticeable patterns of “missing
bids”: a missing mass of close bids, and a missing mass of bids close to the reserve price.
Remarkably, we show that both patterns are present in a sample of procurement auctions
from Japan: close bids, and bids close to the reserve price are unusually rare. Interestingly,
as we show in Chassang et al. (2019), testing for missing bids turns out to yield safe tests.
However, these are low-powered tests that only become safe asymptotically, as the sample
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of bids grows large.
Our paper relates to a growing academic literature developing statistical methods to de-
tect cartels.4 Collusive bidding patterns can be detected by measuring the level of correlation
among bids (Bajari and Ye, 2003), by looking for price patterns predicted by the theory of
repeated games (Porter, 1983, Ellison, 1994), or by exploiting changes in the auction format
(Chassang and Ortner, 2019). Statistical tests of collusion have also been developed for
average-price auctions (Conley and Decarolis, 2016) and multi-stage auctions with rebidding
(Kawai and Nakabayashi, 2018). We complement this literature by showing that cartels do
adapt to regulatory screens, and that using safe tests ensures that statistical screens do not
create new collusive equilibria.
A smaller literature studies the equilibrium impact of antitrust oversight. Besanko and
Spulber (1989) and LaCasse (1995) study static models of equilibrium regulation. Closer
to our work, Cyrenne (1999) and Harrington (2004) study repeated oligopoly models in
which colluding firms might get investigated and fined whenever prices exhibit large and
rapid fluctuations. A common observation from these papers is that antitrust oversight may
backfire, allowing cartels to sustain higher equilibrium profits.5 We provide evidence that
concerns about adaptive cartels are valid, but that they can be addressed using safe tests.
Our work is also related to the literature on auction design in the presence of collusion.
Abdulkadiroglu and Chung (2003), Che and Kim (2006, 2009) and Pavlov (2008) show
that appropriate auction design can limit the cost of collusion when cartel members have
deep pockets and can make payments upfront. Che et al. (2018) studies optimal auction
design when collusive bidders are cash-constrained. Our paper complements this literature
by showing how an antitrust agency can limit the effects of collusion by screening firms with
safe tests.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up our framework to study collusion
4See Porter (2005) and Harrington (2008) for recent surveys of this literature.
5See also McCutcheon (1997), who shows that anti-trust oversight may help sustain collusion by reducing
firms’ incentives to renegotiate equilibrium play after a deviation.
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in the shadow of investigation. Section 3 introduces safe tests. Section 4 establishes that
safe tests do not create new collusive equilibria and can strictly reduce the payoffs of cartels.
Section 5 provides evidence that cartels do in fact adapt to high-powered safe tests. Section
6 presents concluding remarks, and discusses deviations from safe tests. Proofs are collected
in the Appendix.
2 Colluding in the Shadow of Antitrust Authorities
We model the interaction between cartel members and antitrust authorities using a two-stage
game. In the first stage, cartel members participate in repeated first-price procurement auc-
tions. In the second stage, a regulator applies tests to the data generated by the players. If a
test comes out against the null hypothesis of competition, one or more firms are investigated.
We begin by describing the repeated procurement game used in the first stage.
2.1 Repeated procurement
In each period t ∈ N, a buyer needs to procure a single project from a finite set N of potential
suppliers. The auction format is a sealed-bid first-price auction with reserve price r, which
we normalize to r = 1. Ties are broken randomly.
At each period t, a state θt ∈ Θ captures all the relevant past information about the
environment. State θt is revealed to bidders at the end of period t. We assume that θt
evolves as a Markov chain, but do not assume that there are finitely many states, that θt is
ergodic, or that θt is observable to the econometrician.
Firms’ realized costs are denoted by ct = (ci,t)i∈N . Each firm i ∈ N submits a bid
bi,t ∈ [0, 1]∪∅, where ∅ denotes not participating. We assume that bidders incur a cost κ ≥ 0
from submitting a bid in [0, 1]. Let N̂t ⊂ N denote the set of participating bidders at period t.
Profiles of bids are denoted by bt = (bi,t)i∈N̂t . We let b−i,t ≡ (bj,t)j 6=i denote bids from firms
other than firm i, and define ∧b−i,t ≡ minj 6=i bj,t to be the lowest bid among i’s competitors.
5
We assume that bids are publicly revealed at the end of each period. This matches standard
practices in public procurement, where legislation typically requires governments to make
bids public. Our main results can be adapted if only the winning bid was made public, or if
bidders could only observe the identity of the winner.
Costs. We allow for costs that are serially correlated over time, and that may be correlated
across firms within each auction. In particular, we assume that period t costs ct are jointly
drawn from a distribution F (ct|θt), where θt ∈ Θ is the state variable.
Information. In each period t, each bidder i ∈ N privately observes a signal zi,t prior to
bidding.6 The distribution of signals (zi,t)i∈N depends only on (θt, ct). Signals (zi,t)i∈N are
allowed to be arbitrary, and may include information about the state θt, and about costs
ct. This allows our model to nest many informational environments, including private and
common values, correlated values, asymmetric bidders, as well as complete information.
Transfers. We allow for the possibility of transfers across firms, with Ti,j ≥ 0 being a
voluntary transfer from firm i to firm j. Transfer Ti,j generates a benefit B(Ti,j) ≤ Ti,j to
firm j. Transfers take place at the end of each bidding round t, after the project is allocated
and bidders observe the state θt.
We denote by ∆Ti ≡
∑
j∈N\iB(Tj,i)− Ti,j the net transfers received by firm i. For each
t ∈ N and each i ∈ N , let Ti,t = (Ti,j,t)j 6=i denote the transfers made by firm i at period t,
and let Tt = (Ti,t)i∈N .
Overall, firm i’s profits in period t are
πi,t = xi,t × (bi,t − ci,t)− κ1i∈N̂t + ∆Ti,t,
where xi,t ∈ {0, 1} denotes whether or not firm i wins the auction at time t. Firms discount
6Note that firm i’s bid bi,t ∈ [0, 1]∪∅ determines if i will be active in the auction. Hence, this specification
allows firm to choose whether or not to participate after observing their signals.
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future payoffs using common discount factor δ < 1.
Strategies and solution concept. The public history h0t in period t takes the form
h0t = (θs−1,bs−1,Ts−1)s≤t.
Because state θt is publicly revealed at the end of each period, past play conveys no in-
formation about the private types of other players. As a result we do not need to specify
out-of-equilibrium beliefs. A public strategy σi is a mapping
σi : h
0
t , zi,t 7→ bi,t, Ti,t(bt, θt).
Since transfers take place at the end of period t, after state θt is realized, Ti,t(bt, θt) is allowed
to depend on both realized bids bt and realized state θt. Our solution concept is perfect
public Bayesian equilibrium (Athey and Bagwell, 2008).
2.2 Antitrust oversight
The entirety of the collusive game described above, from period t = 0 to t =∞, takes place
within the first stage of our overall game. In the second stage the antitrust authority runs a
vector of tests (τi)i∈N , with τi : h∞ 7→ {0, 1}, where h∞ ∈ H∞ is the realized history of bids
h∞ = (bi,t)i∈N,t∈N.
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If test τi takes value 1, firm i is investigated. This yields an expected penalty K. For
simplicity, we consider fixed penalties. We discuss penalties that depend on the magnitude,
and impact of collusion at the end of Section 4.1. We say that the regulator uses industry-
level tests if
∀h∞ ∈ H∞, τ1(h∞) = τ2(h∞) = · · · = τ|N |(h∞) = τ(h∞).
7More generally, history h∞ may include any data observable to the antitrust authority.
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Note that because penalties τiK in the second stage are not discounted, this game is not
continuous at infinity and the one-shot deviation principle does not necessarily apply (Fu-
denberg and Tirole, 1991). However, the one-shot deviation principle does apply if K = 0,
or if players use strategies under which τi(h∞) = 0 with probability 1 (see Lemma A.1 in
the Appendix).
3 Safe Tests
Safe tests are tests that can be passed under a broad class of environments provided firms
are competitive. Following Chassang et al. (2019), we say that a firm is competitive if and
only if it plays a stage-game best-reply at every history on the equilibrium path.
Definition 1 (competitive histories). Fix a common knowledge profile of play σ and a history
hi,t = (h
0
t , zi,t) of player i. We say that player i is competitive at history hi,t if play at hi,t is
stage-game optimal for firm i given the behavior of other firms σ−i.
We say that a firm is competitive if it plays competitively at all histories on the equilibrium
path. We say that the industry is competitive if all firms play competitively at all histories
on the equilibrium path.
We note that, if the industry is competitive under equilibrium σ, firms must be playing
a stage-game Nash equilibrium in every period along the path of play.
Safe tests. We say that a test τ : H∞ → {0, 1} is safe if it is passed with probabil-
ity one, either by competitive firms or competitive industries.8 Let us denote by λ ≡
8As we discuss below, safe tests may have different data requirements. In practice many of the tests that
can be implemented on real data will likely be slightly “unsafe”.
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prob((ci,t, θt, zi,t)i∈N,t≥0) the underlying economic environment, and by Λ the set of possi-
ble environments λ.
Definition 2 (safe tests). We say that tests (τi)i∈N are unilaterally safe if and only if for
all λ ∈ Λ, and all profiles σ such that firm i is competitive, probλ,σ(τi(h) = 0) = 1.
We say that tests (τi)i∈N are jointly safe if and only if for all λ ∈ Λ, and all profiles σ
such that the industry is competitive, probλ,σ(τi(h) = 0) = 1 for all i ∈ N .
In words, tests are jointly safe (resp. unilaterally safe) if they do not admit false pos-
itives. This concern over false positives coincides with concerns expressed by regulators
(Imhof et al., 2016). In practice, investigation is a highly disruptive process that is only
triggered if sufficiently many pieces of evidence are collected.9
Our main result shows that preventing harm against competitive firms serves an impor-
tant strategic purpose: safe tests cannot unwittingly increase a cartel’s enforcement capa-
bility. As Harrington (2004) highlights, this need not be true for tests that are not safe.
We consider two different settings:
(i) The antitrust authority runs a unilaterally safe test τi on each firm i ∈ N .
Firm i incurs an undiscounted penalty of K ≥ 0 if and only if τi(h∞) = 1 (i.e., if
and only if firm i fails the test).
(ii) The antitrust authority runs a jointly safe test τ on all firms in N .
Firms in N incur a penalty of K ≥ 0 if and only if τ(h∞) = 1.
A notable aspect of safe tests is that they can be freely combined.
Remark 1. If τ and τ ′ are safe tests, then both τ ∧ τ ′ and τ ∨ τ ′ are safe tests.
9This is not to say that a regulator would not launch investigation on the basis of somewhat imperfect
evidence. Rather, that there is little cost in using safe tests.
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4 Screening for Collusion in Equilibrium
4.1 Safe tests do not create new equilibria
This section provides normative foundations for safe tests. We show that safe tests can
be used to place constraints on potential cartel members without creating new collusive
equilibria.
For any K ≥ 0, let Σ(K) denote the set of perfect public Bayesian equilibria of the
game with firm-specific testing and with penalty K. Similarly, let ΣRP (K) denote the set of
Weakly Renegotiation Proof equilibria (Farrell and Maskin, 1989, Bernheim and Ray, 1989)
of the game with penalty K, such that all players get weakly positive expected discounted
payoffs in period 0. Let K ≡ δ. Note that K serves as a rough upper bound on the difference
in the continuation values a player obtains for different actions.10
The following result holds.
Proposition 1 (safe tests do not create new equilibria). (i) If the regulator runs
unilaterally safe tests, then Σ(K) ⊂ Σ(0) for all K > 0.
(ii) If the regulator runs jointly safe tests, then ΣRP (K) ⊂ ΣRP (0) for all K > K.
The proof of Proposition 1 is in the Appendix. Here, we provide an intuition for point (i),
for the special case in which K > K. Note first that when penalty K is large (i.e., K > K),
any equilibrium of the regulatory game has the property that, at all histories (both on and
off path), all firms expect to pass the test with probability 1. Indeed, at every history, each
firm can guarantee to pass the test by playing a stage-game best reply at all future periods.
Suppose K > K and fix σ ∈ Σ(K). For simplicity, suppose that there are no transfers
under σ. Consider a public history h0t , and let β = (βi)i∈N be the bidding profile that firms
use at h0t under σ: for all i ∈ N , βi : zi 7→ R describes firm i’s bid as a function of her signal.
Let V = (Vi)i∈N be firms continuation payoffs excluding penalties after history h
0
t under σ,
10Recall that flow payoffs are normalized by (1− δ), and that r = 1.
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with Vi : b 7→ R mapping bids b = (bj)j∈N to a continuation value for firm i. Bidding profile
β must be such that, for all i ∈ N and all possible signal realizations zi,
βi(zi) ∈ arg max
b
Eβ[(1− δ)(b− ci)1b<∧b−i + δVi(b,b−i)|zi]− Eσ[τi|h0t , b]K
=⇒βi(zi) ∈ arg max
b
Eβ[(1− δ)(b− ci)1b<∧b−i + δVi(b,b−i)|zi],
where the second line follows since all firms pass the test with probability 1 after all histories
under σ ∈ Σ(K). In words, strategy profile σ is such that, at each history h0t , no firm i has
a profitable one shot deviation in a game without testing. The one-shot deviation principle
then implies that σ ∈ Σ(0).11
Let ΣP (0) ⊂ Σ(0) (resp., ΣPRP (0) ⊂ ΣRP (0)) denote the set of equilibria (resp., the set of
Weakly Renegotiation Proof equilibria) of the game without a regulator with the property
that all firms expect to pass the test with probability 1 at every history. The following result
holds:
Corollary 1. Assume K > K.
(i) If the regulator runs unilaterally safe tests, then Σ(K) = ΣP (0).
(ii) If the regulator runs jointly safe tests, then ΣPRP (K) = Σ
P
RP (0).
In words, when penalties are large, the set of equilibria of the regulatory game is equal
to the set of equilibria of the game with no regulator under which all firms pass the test.
We highlight that testing at the individual firm level is crucial for Proposition 1(i).
Indeed, as Cyrenne (1999) and Harrington (2004) show, regulation based on industry level
tests may backfire, allowing cartels to achieve higher equilibrium payoffs. Intuitively, when
testing is at the industry level, cartel members can punish deviators by playing a continuation
strategy that fails the test. This relaxes incentive constraints along the equilibrium path,
11Note that the game with K = 0 is continuous at infinity, and so the one-shot deviation principle holds
in such game.
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and may lead to more collusive outcomes. Proposition 1(ii) shows, however, that jointly safe
tests don’t generate new collusive equilibria that are Weakly Renegotiation Proof.
Outcome contingent penalties. For simplicity, our model assumes a fixed penalty K
from failing the test. We stress, however, that Proposition 1(i) continues to hold if penalty
K is allowed to depend on the outcome h∞ of the repeated game.
12 This allows, for instance,
for penalties that depend on the extent, or impact, of collusion.
4.2 Optimal collusive schemes fail safe tests
Optimal collusion in an idealized setting. We consider a simple special case of the re-
peated procurement model of Section 2 following Chassang and Ortner (2019). Each period,
the profile of costs (ci,t)i∈N is drawn i.i.d. from a joint distribution with c.d.f. F . Costs are
complete information among firms, and firms can engage in efficient transfers: B(Ti,j) = Ti,j.
Note that since we use perfect public Bayesian equilibrium as our solution concept, the fact
that costs are complete information means that bids will also be common knowledge among
bidders. The assumption that costs are common knowledge is not unreasonable under the
assumption that firms are participating in a cartel.
For simplicity we assume that participation is constant; i.e., N̂t = N for all t. This may
capture minimum participation requirements by the auctioneer: the auction is only run if a
minimum number of participants join. Alternatively, if we think of the cost κ of participating
in auctions as the cost of formulating a quality bid, or as the cost of tying up resources in
case a project is won, then this cost may fall to 0 for bidders who don’t intend to win in the
first place.
In this setting, Chassang and Ortner (2019) establishes that all collusive schemes that
are Pareto efficient among bidders are such that:
12Proposition 1(ii) also continues to hold in this case, provided penalties are always larger than K.
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(i) In each period the project is allocated to the lowest cost bidder, i.e. the bidder
i s.t. ci < ∧c−i.
(ii) The winning bid is the maximum value bi,t ≤ r = 1 such that∑
j 6=i
(bi,t − cj,t)+ ≤ δV , (1)
where V is the discounted expected value of bidder profits aggregated at the
cartel level.
(iii) If bi,t < 1, one player j 6= i places bid bj,t = b+i,t, adjacent to, but above the
winning bid bi,t.
Equation (1) states that a winning bid can be sustained if and only if the sum of deviation
temptations (i.e. profits from bidders tempted to undercut the intended winner) is less than
the pledgeable surplus from collusion.
The rationale for having a player bid immediately above winning bidder i is the following.
If the highest sustainable bid is strictly below the reserve price r = 1, then (1) is binding.
This means that pledgeable surplus has positive value for the cartel. In addition, since
bi,t < 1, the winning bidder is potentially able to increase her bid. If the lowest bid of other
bidders were strictly above the winning bid, then the winning bidder would have an incentive
to bid slightly higher. This means that in order to enforce equilibrium behavior, some of
the scarce pledgeable surplus would have to be used to discipline the winning bidder. By
having one bidder bid b+i,t, the deviation temptation of the winning bidder disappears, which
liberates valuable pledgeable surplus.
Two small-sample safe tests. We now describe two safe tests that the collusive behavior
described above fails. Importantly these tests are safe in small samples. Test τ 0 ensures that
there is no mass of close winning and losing bids. Test τ 1 checks that there is no mass of
winning bids at the reserve price.
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Pick ρ ∈ (0, 1) and a finite time T . Let us denote by b(1)t and b
(2)
t the lowest and second
lowest bids of the auction occurring at time t. Tests τ 0 and τ 1 are formally defined as follows:
τ 0 = 1
lim sup
ε↘0




τ 1 = 1
lim sup
ε↘0




Because these tests identify events that have zero-probability under competition, they
are safe tests even using a finite amount of data. Recall that κ ≥ 0 is the cost that bidders
incur for participating in an auction.
Proposition 2. If κ > 0, then τ 0 and τ 1 are jointly safe tests.13
It is immediate that for ρ > 0 small enough, the optimal collusive behavior described
above will fail these tests. Frequent high bids, as captured by test τ 1, would naturally at-
tract the suspicion of regulators. Interestingly, regulators frequently use variance screens
(Abrantes-Metz et al., 2005, Imhof et al., 2016) that flag auctions whose bids are unusually
close together. This corresponds to the pattern of bids captured by test τ 0, with the adjust-
ment that it focuses on the distance between the lowest and second lowest bid, rather than
the variance of the bids. The match is exact when there are only two bidders.
5 Evidence of Cartel Adaptation and Large Sample
Safe Tests
Tests τ 0 and τ 1 are small sample safe tests that rule out plausible collusive equilibria, and
are in fact applied by regulatory agencies. If cartels adapt to regulatory screens, then it is
13An individually safe analogue of τ0, τ0i , can be obtained by looking at auctions such that bidder i is
the second lowest bidder. An individually safe analogue of τ1, τ1i , can be obtained by focusing on auctions
in which player i is the highest bidder.
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plausible that they may adapt to these particular tests. If cartel members communicate, they
may coordinate to avoid triggering such a test. In fact, if a cartel is especially careful about
not triggering this test – more so than a competitive industry with nothing to fear would be
– they might take a margin of safety generating noticeable patterns in large samples.
Specifically, under test τ 0, cartel bidders will avoid bids such that b(2) − b(1) < ε for ε
small. This means that in the sample of auction bids, the mass of close winning bids will
be low. This is the pattern studied in Chassang et al. (2019) by considering the sample
distribution of bid-differences ∆i,t ≡ bi,t − ∧b−i,t. In words, bid difference ∆i,t measures the
margin by which bidder i wins or loses the auction at time t. A cartel that is trying hard to
avoid triggering test τ 0 will generate a sample of bids such that the density of ∆i,t is close
to 0 around ∆i,t = 0.
This prediction holds in the data. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of bid differences
∆i,t for a sample of procurement auctions taking place in the city of Tsuchiura, in Ibaraki
prefecture, Japan. The data contains approximately 400 auctions taking place between May
2007 and October 2009. The auction format is first-price sealed-bid, with a public reserve
price. The median number of bidders is 5, and the median winning bids is approximately
USD 98,000. In previous work, Chassang and Ortner (2019) provide evidence of bidder
collusion in these auctions.
As anticipated, firms seek to avoid suspiciously close bids. Interestingly, as we show in
Chassang et al. (2019), this missing mass of bids around ∆ = 0 is itself a suspicious pattern
that can be turned into a safe test. Specifically, testing whether the elasticity of sample
demand is less than -1 is a safe test which is failed by the data in Figure 1. This latter test,
however, is only safe for large samples.
Consider in turn test τ 1. A cartel seeking to avoid detection will try to ensure that there
are no auctions such that r − b(1) ≤ ε for ε small. This means that the density of winning












Figure 1: Distribution of bid differences ∆
the sample of city level procurement auctions mentioned above. As in the case of τ 0, this
adaptation to test τ 1 creates a bidding pattern that can be exploited to generate a new safe
test. For any ε > 0 define











In words, firms fail test τ 2 whenever the density of winning bids around the reserve price is
zero. The following result holds.
Proposition 3. If κ > 0, test τ 2 is a jointly safe test.
6 Discussion
Summary. We propose an equilibrium model of data-driven screening for cartel behavior in
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Figure 2: The cumulative distribution of winning bids does not reach the reserve price
of safe tests designed to fail firms whose behavior cannot be explained by any competitive
model. We show that such tests cannot help cartels sustain new collusive equilibria, and
that they can be freely combined to create new safe tests.
We identify two safe tests of interest, identifying whether a mass of winning bids are
very close to the second highest bid, and whether a mass of winning bids is very close to the
reserve price. Such tests are safe in small samples, and rule out optimal collusive behavior in
plausible settings. These tests are related to screens used by regulators in practice, and data
from procurement auctions in Japan provides suggestive evidence that cartel members do in
fact adapt to such tests. The bidding patterns generated by the cartels’ adaptive response
can be exploited to generate large-sample safe tests.
Beyond safe tests. Because they have a limited downside while still providing some
bite, we view safe tests as a natural starting point for anti-competitive screens. In practice
however, it seems useful for regulators to go beyond safe tests. Indeed, many safe tests are
only safe for asymptotically large sample sizes. The tests that can be implemented on real
17
data will necessarily fail competitive bidders with positive probability in finite samples. In
addition, regulators may decide to respond to patterns in the data that are unlikely to occur
in a competitive equilibrium given their prior over the underlying environment.
The fact that cartels adapt to the regulatory environment suggests that it is important to
ask whether a candidate screen can potentially enhance the cartel’s mechanics. Answering
this question requires careful thinking on a case by case basis. In the case of tests that are
asymptotically safe but are implemented on finite data, it is possible to show that they do
not significantly enlarge the range of possible equilibrium outcomes.
Appendix
A Proofs
Because the regulatory game we study is not continuous at infinity, the one-shot deviation
principle does not hold in general. However, as a preliminary to the proof of Proposition 1,
we establish a version of the one-shot deviation principle for equilibria in which the bidders
pass safe tests with probability one.
We use the following notation. For any strategy profile σ̂ and any history hi,t = (h
0
t , zi,t),
we use Vi(σ̂, hi,t) = Eσ̂[
∑
s≥t δ
sπi,s|hi,t] to denote firm i’s continuation payoff excluding penal-
ties under σ̂ at history hi,t (πi,s includes firm i’s payoff from the auction at time s, plus
payoffs from transfers). Firm i’s total payoff under strategy profile σ̂ given history hi,t is
Vi(σ̂, hi,t)− Eσ̂[τi|hi,t]K.
Lemma A.1. Let σ be a strategy profile with the property that all firms pass the tests with
probability 1 at every history. Then, σ ∈ Σ(K) if and only if there are no profitable one-shot
deviations.
Proof. Let σ be a strategy profile with the property that all firms pass the test with prob-
ability 1 at every history. Clearly, if σ ∈ Σ(K), there are no profitable one-shot deviations.
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Suppose next that there are no profitable one-shot deviations, but σ /∈ Σ(K). Then, there
exists a player i ∈ N a history hi,t and a strategy σ̃i such that
Vi((σ̃i, σ−i), hi,t) ≥ Vi((σ̃i, σ−i), hi,t)− E(σ̃i,σ−i)[τi|hi,t]K
> Vi(σ, hi,t)− Eσ[τi|hi,t]K = Vi(σ, hi,t),
where the last equality follows since σ is such that all firms pass the test with probability 1
at every history.
The proof now proceeds as in the proof of the one-shot deviation principle in games that
are continuous at infinity. Let ε ≡ Vi((σ̃i, σ−i), hi,t) − Vi(σ, hi,t). Let T > 0 be such that
δT × r = δT < ε/2. Let σ̂i be a strategy for firm i that coincides with σ̃i for all histories
of length t + T or less, and coincides with σi for all histories of length strictly longer than
t + T . Since firms’ flow payoffs are bounded above by r(1 − δ) = 1 − δ, it must be that
Vi((σ̂i, σ−i), hi,t) − Vi(σ, hi,t) ≥ ε/2. Moreover, since σ is such that all firms pass the test
with probability 1 at all histories, and since σ̂i differs from σi only at finitely many periods,
all firms pass the test under (σ̂i, σ−i) with probability 1 at every history.
Next, look at histories of length t + T . If there exists a history hi,t+T of length t + T
that is consistent with hi,t and such that Vi((σ̂i, σ−i), hi,t+T ) > Vi(σ, hi,t+T ), then there exists
a profitable one shot deviation from σ (since σ̂i and σi coincide for all histories of length
t+ T + 1 or longer).
Otherwise, let σ̂1i be a strategy that coincides with σ̃i at all histories of length t+T −1 or
less, and that coincides with σi at all histories of length strictly longer than t+ T − 1. Note
that it must be that Vi((σ̂
1
i , σ−i), hi,t) − Vi(σ, hi,t) ≥ ε/2. We can now look at histories of
length t+T − 1 that are consistent with hi,t. If there exists such a history hi,t+T−1 such that
Vi((σ̂
1
i , σ−i), hi,t+T−1) > Vi(σ, hi,t+T−1), then there exists a profitable one shot deviation from
σ. Otherwise, we can continue in the same way. Since Vi((σ̂i, σ−i), hi,t) − Vi(σ, hi,t) ≥ ε/2,
eventually we will find a profitable one shot deviation by player i, a contradiction. 
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Proof of Proposition 1. We first establish point (i). Fix σ = (σj)j∈N ∈ Σ(K). Then,
for all i ∈ N , for all histories hi,t, and for all σ̃i 6= σi, it must be that
Vi(σ, hi,t)− Eσ[τi|hi,t]K ≥ Vi((σ̃i, σ−i), hi,t)− E(σ̃i,σ−i)[τi|hi,t]K
=⇒ Vi(σ, hi,t) ≥ Vi((σ̃i, σ−i), hi,t)− E(σ̃i,σ−i)[τi|hi,t]K, (2)
where the second inequality follows since Eσ[τi|hi,t]K ≥ 0.
Pick any ε > 0, and let T ∈ N be such that δT < ε. Let σ̂i be a strategy that coincides
with σ̃i at all histories of length s ≤ t + T , and such that under σ̂i, player i plays a static
best response to σ−i at all histories of length s > t+T . Note that firm i passes the test with
probability 1 by playing σ̂i against σ−i.
Since σ̂i and σ̃i only differ on histories of length s > t+ T ,
|Vi((σ̃i, σ−i), hi,t)− Vi((σ̂i, σ−i), hi,t)| < ε. (3)
At the same time, since σ ∈ Σ(K), it must be that
Vi(σ, hi,t)− Eσ[τi|hi,t]K ≥ Vi((σ̂i, σ−i), hi,t)− E(σ̂i,σ−i)[τi|hi,t]K
=⇒ Vi(σ, hi,t) ≥ Vi((σ̂i, σ−i), hi,t) ≥ Vi((σ̃i, σ−i), hi,t)− ε, (4)
where the first inequality in (4) follows since Eσ[τi|hi,t]K ≥ 0 and since firm i passes the test
with probability 1 by playing σ̂i against σ−i, and the second inequality in (4) uses (3). Since
ε > 0 is arbitrary, it must be that Vi(σ, hi,t) ≥ Vi((σ̃i, σ−i), hi,t). Since this is true for every
player i ∈ N , every history hi,t, and any deviation σ̃i 6= σi, we have that σ ∈ Σ(0).
We now turn to the proof of point (ii). We first show that, when penalty K is sufficiently
large, any σ ∈ ΣRP (K) has the property that all firms pass the test with probability 1, both
on and off the path of play.
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To show this, we first note that, at any equilibrium in ΣRP (K) and at every public history
h0t , at least one firm’s continuation payoff is larger than 0. Indeed, by definition, all firms’
payoffs at the start of the game are weakly larger than 0 at any equilibrium in ΣRP (K). By
weak renegotiation proofness, it must be that at every history public h0t at least one firm’s
payoff is larger than 0.
Recall that K ≡ δ. Suppose K > K, and fix σ ∈ ΣRP (K). Towards a contradiction,
suppose that there exists a public history h0t (on or off path) such that, at this history, firms
expect to fail the test with strictly positive probability under strategy profile σ. Then, for
every ε > 0 small, there must exist a history h0s with s ≥ 0 such that, at the concatenated
public history h0t t h0s, firms expect to fail the test with probability at least KK + ε < 1 under
σ. Hence, under σ, at public history h0t t h0s each firm’s continuation payoff at the end







K = −εK < 0, a contradiction.
Suppose K > K and fix σ ∈ ΣRP (K). Since σ is an equilibrium, there cannot be
profitable deviations; in particular, there cannot be profitable one shot deviations: for every
i ∈ N , every history hi,s, and every one-shot deviation σ̃i 6= σi with σi(hi,t) = σ̃i(hi,t) for all
hi,t 6= hi,s,
Vi((σ̃i, σ−i), hi,s)− E(σ̃i,σ−i)[τi|hi,s]K ≤ Vi(σ, hi,s)− Eσ[τi|hi,s]K
⇐⇒ Vi((σ̃i, σ−i), hi,s) ≤ Vi(σ, hi,s), (5)
where the second line in (5) follows since, under equilibrium σ, firms pass the test with
probability 1 at every history.14 By the second line in (5), in the game with K = 0 (i.e.,
no regulator) no firm has a profitable one shot deviation under strategy profile σ. By the
one-shot deviation principle, σ ∈ Σ(0). Finally, since σ is weakly renegotiation proof under
penalty K > K, σ must also be weakly renegotiation proof under penalty K = 0. Therefore,
14The deviation σ̃i from σi at history hi,t can be either at the bidding stage or at the transfer stage.
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σ ∈ ΣRP (0). 
Proof of Corollary 1. We first establish part (i). We start by showing that, when
K > K, any σ ∈ Σ(K) has the property that all firms pass the test with probability 1 at
every history, both on and off the path of play. To see why, note first that for every i ∈ N and
every strategy profile σ−i of i’s opponents, firm i can guarantee to pass the test by playing
a stage-game best reply to σ−i at every history. This implies that each firm’s continuation
payoff cannot be lower than 0 at any history.
Towards a contradiction, suppose there exist σ ∈ Σ(K) and a public history h0t (on or off
path) such that, at this history, firm i expects to fail the test with strictly positive probability
under σ. Then, for every ε > 0 small, there must exist a public history h0s with s ≥ 0 such
that, at the concatenated history h0t t h0s, firm i expects to fail the test with probability
at least K
K
+ ε < 1. Hence, under history h0t t h0s, firm i’s continuation payoff at the end







K = −εK < 0, a contradiction.
The arguments in above imply that for K > K, all equilibria in Σ(K) have the property
that all firms pass the test with probability 1 at every history. Since Σ(K) ⊂ Σ(0) (by
Proposition 1(i)), it follows that, for all K > K, Σ(K) ⊂ ΣP (0).
We now show that ΣP (0) ⊂ Σ(K) whenever K > K. Fix σ ∈ ΣP (0). Since σ is an
equilibrium of the game without a regulator, there cannot be profitable one shot deviations:
for every i ∈ N , every history hi,s, and every one-shot deviation σ̃i 6= σi with σi(hi,t) = σ̃i(hi,t)
for all hi,t 6= hi,s,
Vi((σ̃i, σ−i), hi,s) ≤ Vi(σ, hi,s)
⇐⇒ Vi((σ̃i, σ−i), hi,s)− E(σ̃i,σ−i)[τi|hi,s]K ≤ Vi(σ, hi,s)− Eσ[τi|hi,s]K
where the second line follows since, under σ, all firms pass the test with probability 1 at
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every history. Lemma A.1 then implies that σ ∈ Σ(K).
We now prove part (ii). By Proposition 1(ii) and the arguments in its proof, we have that
ΣRP (K) ⊂ ΣPRP (0) for all K > K. To show that ΣPRP (0) ⊂ ΣRP (K), fix σ ∈ ΣPRP (0), and
note that no firm can have a profitable one-shot deviation under σ: for every i ∈ N , every
history hi,s, and every one-shot deviation σ̃i 6= σi with σi(hi,t) = σ̃i(hi,t) for all hi,t 6= hi,s,
Vi((σ̃i, σ−i), hi,s) ≤ Vi(σ, hi,s)
⇐⇒ Vi((σ̃i, σ−i), hi,s)− E(σ̃i,σ−i)[τi|hi,s]K ≤ Vi(σ, hi,s)− Eσ[τi|hi,s]K
where the second line follows since, under σ, all firms pass the test with probability 1 at
every history. Lemma A.1 then implies that σ ∈ Σ(K). Since σ ∈ ΣRP (0), it must also be
that σ ∈ ΣRP (K). 
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider a competitive equilibrium σ. Consider a bidder i
at history hi,t who participates in the auction at time t. For each bid b, let us denote by
Di,t(b) ≡ probhi,t(b < ∧b−i,t) player i’s subjective probability that she will win the auction if
she bids b. In a competitive equilibrium, for any ε > 0, equilibrium bid bi,t must satisfy
Di,t(bi,t − ε)(bi,t − ε− ci,t) ≤ Di,t(bi,t)(bi,t − ci,t).
Since bidding is costly, it must be that bi,t − ci,t ≥ κ. Hence for all ε < κ, we obtain that
Di,t(bi,t − ε) ≤ Di,t(bi,t)
bi,t − ci,t





By construction, we have that Di,t(bi,t − ε) ≥ Di,t(bi,t). Hence, Di,t(·) has no mass points at
bid bi,t. Altogether, this implies that probσ(τ
0 = 1) = 0 and probσ(τ
1 = 1) = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider a competitive equilibrium σ. Fix a bidder i, and a
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history hi,t at which bidder i participates in the auction, bidding bi,t < r = 1. For each bid
b, let us denote by Di,t(b) ≡ probhi,t(b < ∧b−i,t) player i’s subjective probability that she will
win the auction if she bids b at history hi,t. Note that Di,t(bi,t)(bi,t − ci,t) ≥ κ > 0, since
otherwise bidder i won’t participate. Hence, bi,t − ci,t ≥ κ.
By incentive compatibility, for any ε > 0, bid bi,t < 1 must satisfy:
Di,t(bi,t)(bi,t − ci,t) ≥ Di,t(bi,t + ε)(bi,t + ε− ci,t)
⇐⇒ Di,t(bi,t) ≥ Di,t(bi,t + ε)
bi,t + ε− ci,t
bi,t − ci,t




and so Di,t(bi,t) > Di,t(bi,t + ε) for all ε > 0 small. This implies that, for all ε > 0, the
distribution of winning bids induced by σ must place positive mass on [r − ε, r]. Indeed,
suppose not, and let b < r = 1 be the supremum of the support of the distribution of winning
bids induced by σ. Note then that, for every history hj,s, Dj,s(b) = Dj,s(b) for all b ∈ (b, r].
By definition of b, there exists a sequence of histories (hik,tk)k∈N with bik,tk → b as k → ∞.
Note that, for all ε > 0, and using the inequality in (6),
lim
k→∞










Abdulkadiroglu, A. and K.-S. Chung (2003): “Auction design with tacit collusion,”
Columbia and Northwestern University Working Paper.
Abrantes-Metz, R., L. Froeb, J. Geweke, and C. Taylor (2005): “A variance
screen for collusion. US Federal Trade Commission,” Tech. rep., Bureau of Economics
Working Paper.
Athey, S. and K. Bagwell (2008): “Collusion with persistent cost shocks,” Economet-
rica, 76, 493–540.
24
Bajari, P. and L. Ye (2003): “Deciding between competition and collusion,” Review of
Economics and Statistics, 85, 971–989.
Baker, J. and D. Rubinfeld (1999): “Empirical Methods in Antitrust Litigation: Review
and Critique,” American Law and Economics Review, 1, 386–435.
Bernheim, B. D. and D. Ray (1989): “Collective dynamic consistency in repeated
games,” Games and Economic Behavior, 1, 295–326.
Besanko, D. and D. F. Spulber (1989): “Antitrust enforcement under asymmetric
information,” The Economic Journal, 99, 408–425.
Chassang, S., K. Kawai, J. Nakabayashi, and J. M. Ortner (2019): “Data Driven
Regulation: Theory and Application to Missing Bids,” Tech. rep., National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Chassang, S. and J. Ortner (2019): “Collusion in auctions with constrained bids: The-
ory and evidence from public procurement,” Journal of Political Economy, 127, 2269–2300.
Che, Y.-K., D. Condorelli, and J. Kim (2018): “Weak cartels and collusion-proof
auctions,” Journal of Economic Theory, 178, 398–435.
Che, Y.-K. and J. Kim (2006): “Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation,” Economet-
rica, 74, 1063–1107.
——— (2009): “Optimal collusion-proof auctions,” Journal of Economic Theory, 144, 565–
603.
Conley, T. G. and F. Decarolis (2016): “Detecting bidders groups in collusive auc-
tions,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 8, 1–38.
Cyrenne, P. (1999): “On antitrust enforcement and the deterrence of collusive behaviour,”
Review of Industrial Organization, 14, 257–272.
Ellison, G. (1994): “Theories of cartel stability and the joint executive committee,” The
Rand journal of economics, 37–57.
Farrell, J. and E. Maskin (1989): “Renegotiation in repeated games,” Games and
economic behavior, 1, 327–360.
Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1991): “Game theory,” .
Harrington, J. E. (2004): “Cartel pricing dynamics in the presence of an antitrust au-
thority,” RAND Journal of Economics, 651–673.
——— (2008): “Detecting cartels,” Handbook of antitrust economics, 213, 245.
25
Imhof, D., Y. Karagök, and S. Rutz (2016): “Screening for bid-rigging-does it work?”
Tech. rep., Université de Fribourg.
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